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PREFACE
This is the study of an American myth. This case essentially
analyzes the role of the League of the Iroquois in the founding of
American government. The study narrowly focuses on the Iroquois
influence on one individual, Benjamin Franklin, who played a role in the
drafting of the Albany Plan of Union of 1754. But the question of
Iroquois League influence can be taken a step further. In this year 
celebrating the Bicentennial of the adoption of the United States 
Constitution, the question to be more generally addressed is that of the 
influence of the League on the authors of that document, portions of
which are similar to the earlier Albany Plan.
This myth has evolved like many others--as a way for Americans to 
express pride in the democratic tendencies which they believe have always 
been a part of the fabric of this country, perhaps stemming from native 
traditions. Because of the narrow focus of this study, it is limited to 
analyzing any influences of the Iroquois on one colonist, Franklin. It 
studies Franklin's knowledge of the League and whether that knowledge may 
have influenced his involvement in the drafting of an early plan of union 
for the British colonies— the Albany Plan of 1754.
The method used in this study involved several components. In
order to study the League's structure, the thoughts and writings of 
anthropologists and ethnographers throughout the last two centuries were 
used. Unfortunately, sources detailing the League's structure
contemporaneous with Franklin are very limited. Most are nineteenth and 
twentieth-century written descriptions evolving from an oral tradition.
In contrast, greater numbers of sources exist to study Franklin
and the drafting of the Albany Plan. Franklin left many of his thoughts
in his Papers and Writings. These include his thoughts on the Iroquois
and his involvement in the formation of the Albany Plan. The writings of
Franklin's contemporaries as well as the New York colonial documents help 
to elucidate Franklin's involvement in the Albany Congress. These docu­
ments were used in drawing comparisons/contrasts with the Iroquois League 
structure.
The study of the Iroquois' influence on the beginnings of the 
United States has been like solving one big puzzle. The sources, which 
are weak, contrived, or sometimes nonexistent, have led the researcher to 
a great deal of pondering and judicial reasoning. The trip has opened 
her eyes to some of the frustrations and joys of dealing with a 
historical myth.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to identify the influence, if any, 
of the League of the Iroquois Indians of New York on the 1754 Albany Plan 
of Union, the authorship of which has been attributed to Benjamin 
Franklin. The study addresses a twentieth-century myth stating that 
Franklin used the Iroquois League as his model for the plan, and hinting 
that it was the model used for the establishment of the government of the 
fledgling United States, through the Constitution.
The study is divided into four components— a review of the 
Iroquois League structure, an examination of Franklin's possible 
knowledge of the League of the Iroquois, a review of the formation of the 
Albany Plan, and a comparison of the League and the Plan. Franklin's 
writings, the writings of his contemporaries, the official New York 
colonial records documenting the Albany Congress of 1754, and studies of 
the League by historians and anthropologists were examined.
The results of the study suggest little documentable influence of 
the Iroquois League on the author of the Albany Plan. Benjamin Franklin 
had limited contacts with the Iroquois. Further, the research indicates 
doubts as to the actual author of the plan. Finally, the study concludes 
that it is impossible for twentieth-century historians and anthropolo­
gists to fully understand the workings of a native American political 
organization such as the Iroquois League. Because Franklin may not have 
been the sole author of the Albany Plan, because he did not know enough 
about the League, because the League itself had an oral rather than a 
written tradition, and because anthropologists do not fully understand 
the League's structure, a twentieth-century myth, based on a simplistic 
notion, should not continue to be propagated.
viii
"SIX NATIONS OF IGNORANT SAVAGES":
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND THE IROQUOIS LEAGUE OF NATIONS
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, French and British 
statesmen and soldiers struggled for the control of the eastern part of 
North America. These opponents vied with each other for the allegiance 
of the native Americans on the continent in a tug-of-war that created 
constant unrest on the frontier. In an attempt to ensure the loyalty of 
the Iroquois Indians in particular, the British Board of Trade called for 
a conference to be held at Albany, New York, in 1754. There the British 
hoped to form a treaty with the Iroquois, just one of several that had 
been sealed over previous years.
Along with representatives from a majority of the colonies, 
Benjamin Franklin attended the Albany Congress as a delegate from 
Pennsylvania. Franklin, like members of the Board of Trade, realized the 
necessity of cooperation between the English colonies. To achieve this 
cooperation, he brought along his ideas'for a plan of union for the 
colonies. The Albany Congress's delegates, in addition to forming a 
treaty with the Iroquois, accepted Franklin's plan and sent it to the 
separate colonial assemblies and to the Board of Trade for approval. But 
the Board and all the assemblies rejected it. Franklin was disappointed 
because he realized that the French threat, the control of Indian 
affairs, and the need for a union of the British colonies were inter­
twined. He felt that the plan constituted a solution for the hard-
1
pressed English colonies.
Studies of the Albany Congress have led historians to search out 
Franklin's motives and the sources of his ideas. Certain twentieth-
2
century historians and students of the Congress have suggested that 
Franklin could have used the Iroquois confederation as a model for his 
plan. This League of Six Nations, a political union of six tribes, 
including the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, Oneidas, Cayugas, and 
Tuscaroras, developed within the latter-day New York. Whether or not 
Franklin used the Iroquois as his model for a plan of union becomes a 
valid subject for intensive study. Historians try to be as objective as 
possible in studying and interpreting the past, but they are sometimes 
guilty of stretching the truth and often may perpetuate distorted 
stories. Mythmaking occurs when unclear events are misinterpreted.
"PRETTY LITTLE STORIES OF HISTORY"
In the Franklin-Iroquois case, those historians who believe that 
Franklin had an Iroquois model enjoy quoting Franklin's words. In a 
letter dated March 20, 1751, Franklin wrote James Parker, printer and 
postmaster of New York, expressing his ideas for a union of all mainland 
British colonies. The letter included this statement:
It would be a very strange Thing, if Six Nations of 
ignorant Savages should be capable of forming a Scheme for 
such an Union, and be able to execute it in such a Manner, 
as that it has subsisted Ages, and appears indissoluble; 
and yet that a like Union should be impracticable for ten 
or a Dozen English Colonies, to whom it is more necessary, 
and must be more advantageous; and who cannot be ^upposed 
to want an equal Understanding of their Interests.
The danger occurs when it is inferred from this statement that Franklin
respected the Iroquois to such an extent that he used their League as a
direct model for his own thoughts. To take the point further, a danger
is involved when anyone stretches historical fact, possibly to twist and
distort it to his or her advantage. Thomas A. Bailey, studying myths in
the 1960s, believed that most of the "pretty little stories of history
are in some degree false, if pursued to their smallest details." He
defined a historical myth as "an account or belief that is demonstrably
3
untrue, in whole or substantial part." Bailey discouraged the use of
myths as a way to teach American values. An objective historian needs to
try to find the needle of truth in the haystack of distortion.
4
5A few twentieth-century historians and history texts have stated
their beliefs that Franklin used the Iroquois League as his union model.
One early example appeared in Felix Cohen's 1952 article, "Americanizing
4
the White Man." Citing Franklin's "Six Nations" statement, Cohen
implied that Franklin greatly admired the Iroquois confederacy and had
the League in mind when he created his plan for uniting the British
colonies. According to Cohen, Franklin incorporated in his plan the
advice given by the Iroquois chief Canasatego, who spoke to the British
representatives negotiating a treaty at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in
1744. Although Franklin was not present, he did have the opportunity to
read Canasatego1s words as they were recorded at the council: "We are a
powerful Confederacy; and by your observing the same Methods, our Wise
Forefathers have taken, you will acquire such Strength and power.
5
Therefore whatever befalls you, never fall out with one another."
Several suggestions of a possible influence from the Iroquois
League appeared in textbooks and monographs in the 1970s. Wilbur Jacobs
dealt with the question in Dispossessing the American Indian. Jacobs
specifically looked at the ideas formulated by the authors of the
Constitution and concluded that "the case for the Iroquois is not so
£
farfetched as one might think." Franklin, "an admirer of the Iroquois 
league," had good reason to know its virtues, said Jacobs, for the 
printer from Philadelphia also served as a commissioner to a 1752 Indian 
conference in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Jacobs went on to describe how 
later, at the Albany Conference of 1754, Franklin and his fellow dele­
gates got a scolding from Hendrick, a sachem of the Mohawk tribe. 
Hendrick praised the League and told the British that their
6"disorganized, womanlike method of defense against the French was to be 
7
deplored." When Jacobs concluded with the statement, "It is known that
other framers of the Constitution had knowledge of Indian confederation
systems and the ideals of Indian democracy," he seemed to imply that
0
Franklin, as well as other colonists, was very familiar with the League.
High school students who have used The American Adventure: The
Early Years— 20,000 B.C.-A.D. 1763 have confronted a blatant example of
the formation of a myth. This textbook incorporated the following state­
ment into a discussion of the way of life of the Iroquois Indians:
"Benjamin Franklin used the example of the League of the Iroquois in
9
drawing up a plan of union for the 13 British colonies in 1754." Here 
is the danger that Thomas Bailey foresaw. The writers of this text 
simplified a complicated and even ambiguous event, full of discrepancies; 
the intent of their "story" was to extol the virtues of the Iroquois, but 
in so doing, they possibly distorted historical facts.
Perhaps the greatest distortions appear when writers feel per­
sonal connections to their subjects. Donald Grinde, who claims Yamasee 
Indian descent, wanted the readers of The Iroquois and the Founding of 
the American Nation to understand the importance of the Iroquois to 
America. Grinde's writing supported his bias, as he intended to "cast 
off the arrogance of Western civilization in order to eliminate the idea 
of a superior culture," and to "chronicle the role of the Iroquois in 
forming a part of the political basis for the new American nation.
In order to do that, he gave numerous examples of the Iroquois' 
influence, including the part that he felt they played in the thoughts of 
Benjamin Franklin. He mentioned, without proof, an Iroquois suggestion
to the colonists that the latter would do well to follow the Iroquois
principles of confederation. At Albany, Grinde continued, Franklin met
with the conference delegates and the Iroquois, and "hammered out a plan
which he acknowledged to be similar to the Iroquois Confederacy."^ But
Grinde did not specifically indicate where and when Franklin
"acknowledged" this fact. Discussing Hendrick's criticisms of the
British, cited by Jacobs, Grinde thought Hendrick "hinted [that] the
Iroquois would not ally themselves with the 'thirteen fires' until a
12
suitable form of unity was established among them." Grinde confessed
that Franklin only grudgingly recognized any Iroquois influence, yet
Franklin's "Six Nations" statement "demonstrates the debt that he and
13other colonists owed the Indians in framing the Albany Plan of Union."
Although the sources indicate that Franklin made his statement in 1751,
not in 1754, Grinde implied that Franklin presented it at the Albany
Congress. Finally, when Grinde printed the Albany Plan in an appendix,
he omitted four paragraphs which, in his mind, may not have supported his
premise that the Iroquois League was the role model for the democratic
14tendencies of the colonists.
In a recent publication, Forgotten Founders: Benjamin Franklin,
the Iroquois and the Rationale for the American Revolution, Bruce 
Johansen reviewed what was written on American Indians and particularly 
on the Iroquois to date, including Grinde's work. Johansen studied the 
place of the Iroquois in American history, focusing on the eighteenth 
century, and concluded with remarks on the role of the Iroquois in the 
communication of democratic ideas. He felt that similar ideas even 
affected nineteenth-century thinkers like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
8Johansen perceived a "plausible argument that the Iroquois had indeed
played a key role in the ideological birth of the United States,
15especially through Franklin's advocacy of federal Union." Johansen
tried to prove his objectivity and sincerity. He believed that "the
argument around which this book is centered is only one part of a broader
effort not to rewrite history, but to expand it, to broaden our knowledge
beyond the intellectual straight-jacket of ethnocentrism that tells us
that we teach, but we do not learn from, peoples and cultures markedly
16different from our own." Further, "the Iroquois were not the only
American Indians to develop notions of federalism, political liberty, and
democracy long before they heard of the Greeks or the Magna Charta.
Benjamin Franklin was not the only Euro-American to combine his own
17heritage with what he found in his new homeland."
All of these authors credit the Iroquois with political
organization and unity, a unity that quite conceivably was admired by the
colonists, especially those with mandates for running colonial
governments. However, the strength and unity of the Iroquois Confederacy
waxed and waned a number of times in the centuries following its 
18
founding. Various colonists, who observed the League in different
decades of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, described what im­
pressed them most about the Iroquois' "Tree of the Great Peace," possibly 
leaving out or not perceiving some of the important features of the 
League structure. Improper understanding of the "Great Peace" led to 
"pretty little stories" in the twentieth century.
"THE TREE OF THE GREAT PEACE"
The League of the Iroquois originally consisted of five member
19
nations— the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, Oneidas and Cayugas. In the 
Iroquois legend of the founding of the League, which traditionally took 
place around 1600, the heroes Dekanawidah and Hiawatha brought the 
message of peace to these nations who were squabbling over internal prob­
lems. Dekanawidah accomplished this by planting the "Tree of the Great
Peace," establishing an oral constitution to guide the newly formed 
20League. Although his main intent was to establish peace among the
bickering nations, he also wanted them to unite to acquire numerical
strength. In 1780, David Zeisberger commented that the Iroquois called
themselves the "united people, having united for the purpose of always
reminding each other that their safety and power consist in a mutual and
21strict adherence to their alliance." Dekanawidah's unwritten constitu­
tion or "Great Peace" provided a way for this united people to work 
together for their mutual advantage.
Symbolism played an important role in the League's tradition. 
The best-known symbol for the Iroquois League is the longhouse, the typi­
cal dwelling of these Eastern Woodlands Indians. Jesuit Father Joseph 
Lafitau admired the Five Nations: "In spite of different reasons for
jealousy, [they] have always kept united, and to indicate their union
they say that they form a single house which we call the Iroquois 
22Longhouse." According to John Heckewelder, a Moravian missionary who
9
10
described the Onondagas as the head of the League and the others as
"brothers and sons," the nations united as brothers in a "family compact"
23within this longhouse. The Iroquois considered the Mohawks and Senecas
to be the Elder Brothers, while the Oneidas and Cayugas were thought of
as the Younger Brothers; the Onondagas acted as arbiters in the system.
When they were seated in the longhouse of the confederacy, the Iroquois
thought of the Mohawks as the Keepers of the Eastern Door of the Lodge
and the Senecas as the Keepers of the Western Door, while the Onondagas
sat in the middle geographically and figuratively as the Firekeepers and
Wampum Keepers. Dekanawidah symbolized the unity of the Longhouse League
with a bundle of arrows, one from each nation, which, "when it is made
24and completely tied together, no one can bend or break."
At the heart of the social structure of the League lay kinship
structure; clan as well as village, the lowest denominators, formed the
backbone of the League. Dekanawidah based the League on the matrilineal
kinship system, decreeing that "women shall be considered the progenitors
of the Nation," and they were to control the land, at least up to the 
25
wood's edge. The longhouse family included the siblings of a wife's
mother, the wife's siblings, the wife's children, and her daughter's
children. A clan was comprised of two or more maternal families who
26behaved as if the members of each generation were siblings. 
Originally, fifteen clans made up Iroquois society. They were 
distributed throughout the Five Nations, and members of one clan recog­
nized every other member of that clan as a relative, no matter from which 
Nation he or she hailed. Members of the same clan could not marry. 
According to Lewis Henry Morgan, one of the earliest Iroquois anthropolo-
11
gists, the system divided the clans among the nations so that "the whole
27race was interwoven into one great family."
Clans had great influence in government, according to Sara Henry
Stites, whose 1904 doctoral dissertation discussed the "Economics of the
Iroquois." She maintained that the clans held the actual sovereignty in
the League: "The government of the Iroquois was a government for and by
the clans, acting in an assembly composed either of representatives or of
28all the members of a clan." Clans were so powerful in government,
Stites felt, because they controlled economic activities; although each
tribal unit occupied its own territory and owned the supply sources in
its region, within the tribal boundary the clans controlled the access to
those sources. Economy directed the structure and actions of the
29confederacy, and the clans were at the heart of the economic system.
Further, two or more clans composed a moiety, and each tribe was 
divided into two moities. Clan members of moieties acted as if they were 
brothers and sisters. The two moieties that formed a tribe served 
ceremonial functions, condoling each other's dead and performing other 
rituals. The duality of the tribal moieties was applied to the five 
tribes, which were divided into two moieties, the Elder Brothers and the 
Younger Brothers.^
In order to maintain a system of duality and reciprocity, Iro­
quois kinship and social structure extended to its political structure. 
The League depended on individual villages and nations for its existence 
and its stability. This "league of ragged villagers," as Benjamin
Franklin named it, survived because the roots of the "Tree of the Great
31Peace" grew deep into the heart of Iroquois village and family life.
12
Although unity theoretically formed the basis of the League, the 
Iroquois wanted to maintain the independence of the individual nations 
and the villages that made up the nations. Lafitau confirmed the inde­
pendence of the village government when he wrote that "all the villages
govern themselves in the same way, by themselves, and as if they were
32independent of each other." Each village had its own village council 
chief or chiefs, who were chosen from smaller residential units, some­
times even from a single household. In this matrilineal society, clan 
matrons chose the men on the village council. The village council was 
comprised of ranking clan chiefs and elders chosen by clan matrons. The 
same applied to the League Council; it too was attended by clan or tribal
chiefs whose titles were hereditary, but also by other chiefs whose
33titles died with them.
Clans were represented among the sachems. The senior woman of a 
clan chose the successor of a deceased "federal" chief from her own 
lineage. Both the Mohawks and Oneidas had only three clans and nine 
League chiefs each. The Onondagas had nine clans and the Cayugas and 
Senecas approximatly eight, but the number of chiefs differed among all 
three. The Onondagas had fourteen chiefs— including the most important, 
Thadodaho— who were distributed unequally among the nine clans. The Ca­
yugas held ten chieftainships, which were distributed unequally among the 
clans; to make matters even more confusing, the Cayugas had more than one 
Bear, Turtle, and Snipe clan. The Senecas had only eight chiefs and
eight clans, but the chieftainships were not distributed equally among
34their clans either.
Fifty sachems or federal chiefs from the tribal councils made up
13
the League Council. Each chief dropped his own name when installed and
adopted the hereditary name of one of the original founding sachems. A
sachem's power extended throughout the confederacy. A Mohawk sachem
could expect the same obedience from any other nation that he would from
the Mohawks, and according to Morgan, "herein we discover an element of
Union, or rather a tendency to merge the national governments into one
35strong central government."
Hereditary sachems cemented their authority by creating a special
category of chiefs which served an intermediate function between the
hereditary sachems and the people. These Pine Tree Chiefs were elected
by the Council according to merit. Both the office and title died with
the holder since neither was hereditary. The Pine Tree chiefs had a
voice but no vote in Council proceedings. Their office allowed for a
certain amount of popular participation in' League affairs, and provided
opportunity for the more ambitious and talented among them to have a
voice. By creating the office of Pine Tree chief, the League created a
36
system of checks and balances for itself.
In the Council each nation had only one vote in decisions, but 
certain tribes claimed special prerogatives. Since the Mohawks were re­
garded as the Eldest Brothers, they had to be present for a Council to be 
legal. Mohawks also had the right to exact tribute from surrounding 
dependent nations. The Onondagas kept the wampum and held the veto power 
in the Council. Finally, the "Great Peace" gave the Senecas the privi­
lege of having the only two permanent war chiefs of the League because 
their nation lay closest to the unfriendly tribes in the west. These two 
war chiefs helped to settle disagreements and to organize warfare.
14
Councils sent representatives from the villages to tribal or national
councils, through which individual nations were free to make a separate
37war, or a separate peace, with a foreign nation, or any part of it.
In addition, each nation had its own war chief, chosen by the
women, who not only led the particular nation to war, if necessary, but
also had the privilege of bringing any of the peoples' complaints to the
League Council, although they were not actual members of the Council.
Members of the Council could not fight in wars because they acted as
peace officers. If a sachem wanted to fight, he had to put aside his
38symbol of office— his horns— and fight as a common warrior. Therefore, 
the "Great Peace" allowed for individualized warfare, but also made cer­
tain that there were leaders .who could act for the League in an 
emergency.
At the individual level, Dekanawidah hoped to place equal power
and authority in the hands of the sachems. He told the original "lords"
that they were "all of equal standing and of equal power," and that if
they disagreed, "the consequences [would] be most serious and this
39disagreement [would] cause [them] to disregard each other." The
i
talents and oratorical style of certain sachems created degrees of ine­
quality among them as they vied for influence in Council debates. One
sachem, Thadodaho of the Onondagas, inherited the special right to
40
preside over the Council, but he had no particular executive powers.
Internally, the League Council functioned in all aspects of
government. "The sachems," wrote Morgan, "formed the Council of the
League, the ruling body, in which resided the executive, legislative and
41
judicial authority." The Council performed a variety of duties. It
15
settled quarrels between its member nations, "since it is hardly possible
that among peoples where license reigns with all impunity . . there
42
should not happen some event capable of causing a rupture." The League
Council controlled the confederation treasury, which was filled by
exacting tribute from dependent peoples and by receiving gifts from the
43
Iroquois nations themselves. It also invested sachems with their of­
fice through a condolence ceremony. In this ritual, the Iroquois of one 
moiety reciprocally condoled with the living of the deceased sachem's 
moiety, in honor of the deceased sachem, and installed the successor, 
whom the women chose from the clan of the deceased. This method of
selection, because it was based on the stable clan structure of the
44League, ensured an orderly transfer of power.
Externally, the League Council carried on essential diplomatic
duties. It declared war for the League and made peace, since either an
individual nation or the entire League could go to war. It sent and
received ambassadors and entered into alliances with other tribes. In
conducting a treaty of peace or alliance, the Council held a special
meeting in which it exchanged wampum belts with the other nation or
nations. For the Iroquois, an agreement was not considered valid unless
wampum had been exchanged. These belts were mnemonic devices to help the
Indians remember what the parties agreed upon at the treaty session. At
the treaty, wampum also served to organize and regulate the flow of the
treaty council's business, since wampum was exchanged regularly
throughout the meeting. The Iroquois placed as high a value on wampum as
45the British would have placed on a written contract or agreement.
Another external power enabled the League to regulate the affairs
16
of subjugated nations. League members considered themselves to be at war 
with any tribes not allied with their confederacy. The Iroquois some­
times coerced tribes to enter their "pax Iroquoia" or "Great Peace." In 
fact, Dekanawidah's constitution provided for the conquest of nations who 
refused the Iroquois peace. If a foreign tribe would not accept peace 
after three offers from the Iroquois, the League could declare war. If 
the Iroquois won the war, they would automatically admit the nation to 
their peace. The Iroquois then supported the subjugated nation 
militarily and "after [the Iroquois] have satiated their Revenge by some
cruel Examples, they adopt the rest of their Captives; who, if they
46behave well, become equally esteemed with their own People."
If a foreign nation wished to be admitted to the "pax Iroquoia," 
the Iroquois would follow the procedures stipulated by the legendary con­
stitution. A prospective tribe applied for membership through one of the 
Five Nations, and the membership could be rescinded by the Council at any 
time. The nation retained freedom in running its own internal affairs, 
but had no voice in the Council. If it had something to say, it spoke 
through its sponsor. The Tuscaroras best exemplified such a willing
nation. When their enemies forced them out of North Carolina in 1714
47
they headed north to join the League. Lewis Henry Morgan described the
League as a "progressive confederacy," since it continuously attempted to
accumulate power by absorbing foreigners into its confederation. The
fact that the League could maintain its population by so doing made it
48strong against Europeans, while other native groups became weaker.
Meetings of the Council took place each year at Onondaga. John 
Bartram, who traveled there, described Onondaga in 1743 as the "town
17
[that] serves the five nations as Baden does the thirteen cantons of
Switzerland, with this difference, that Onondaga is at the same time the
49
capital of a canton." Generally, the Onondaga nation called the 
meeting, but each nation had the power to do so if it wished and to pre­
scribe the time and place. Those attending a Council meeting included 
the required sachems, Pine Tree and war chiefs, and women and children 
who came to listen. The meetings included ceremonial practices such as 
singing and praying, but the.-importance of a meeting lay in speech-making 
and debate. Actually, the debate consisted of a series of speeches made 
in turn by the sachems. The Iroquois art of oratory impressed Benjamin 
Franklin and other colonists, as indicated in their writings.
The Iroquois Council placed great emphasis on unanimous deci­
sions. To try to arrive at one on a particular matter, the sachems of 
each nation first had to decide unanimously among themselves, for each 
nation had only one vote. Then the Elder Brothers and Younger Brothers 
respectively met and arrived at decisions within each phratry, or set of 
brothers. The phratries then took their decisions to the Council where 
the nations, with the Onondagas as arbiters, tried to arrive at a final 
unanimous vote. The Onondagas could use their veto power when indecision
occurred, but the veto could be overridden by the phratries. In the case
51of a stalemate, the members dropped the matter from discussion.
As with any established confederation of government, the League 
had its positive and negative aspects. Theoretically, it allowed for the 
indirect participation of the people in their government. Specifically, 
it preserved the right of every person to express his own thoughts by 
permitting public councils to be held at the local level. These councils
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acted as a check on the activities of the federal Council. Women and
warriors also met in local councils periodically' and could voice their
opinions to the League Council through representatives. Arthur Parker,
an anthropologist of Seneca descent, described the extraordinary
political power of Iroquois women in contrast to the minimal rights
granted to women at the the turn of the twentieth century. He remarked
that "women thus had great power for not only could they nominate their
rulers but also depose them. Here, then, we find the right of
popular nomination, the right of recall and of woman suffrage, all
flourishing in the old America of the Red Man and centuries before it
52became the clamour of the new America of the white invader." Another
positive aspect of the League was its preservation of local autonomy and
"the perfect independence and individuality of the national 
53sovereignties." The Iroquois tried to avoid a strong central
government and the concentration of power in only a few hands.
Although the League's unity has been praised by anthropologists
and some historians, it may not have exhibited as much cohesiveness as
has been thought. The interests and objectives of the Mohawks and the
Senecas frequently clashed, especially in the seventeenth century, and
the individual nations often dealt differently with foreign nations,
54whether European or Indian. Because individual nations had the freedom 
of the "Great Peace," they went to war more frequently on their own than 
they did under the "wings" of the confederacy. Further, because the 
original founders of the League feared the usurpation of political power 
by the federal Council, the constitution provided no machinery for execu­
ting Council decisions. Usually, individual tribes carried out deci­
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55sions; if not, the Council appointed special agents.
The League also faced problems because of the inequality among 
nations and individuals. Since the Iroquois saw themselves as superior 
to all other nations, they did not admit new nations on a basis of 
equality. This led to friction and ineffectiveness in controlling depen­
dent nations. Because only a few men met as representatives of the 
separate nations and excluded dependent nations from the Council, the 
League had more oligarchic than democratic elements. Morgan felt that an 
oligarchy had its advantages. Specifically, the power was distributed 
equally among an unchangeable number of rulers, which contributed to sta­
bility. Member nations were not ruled by a tyrannical body of sachems. 
Perhaps the Six Nations made their League as democratic as they realized 
it could be. But the extent of democracy has been difficult for 
anthropologists to determine.^
The League played a major role in European-Indian relationships 
of the eighteenth century. Even with the individual freedoms taken by 
member tribes, the Iroquois nations stuck together in a loose 
confederation that was more efficient than any other Indian alliance of 
the time. The threat of English and French expansion produced a stronger 
League after 1701, when the Treaty of Ryswick, ending King William's War,
brought among the Iroquois League and the two European powers a stance of
57neutrality that allowed the Iroquois to regain their strength. 
Both colonial powers tried to use the Iroquois as pawns in their struggle 
for empire. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, the Iroquois had 
decided to ally with the British. England offered several advantages. 
She did not penetrate into the Indian lands as far as France did, and she
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offered certain desirable British goods such as woolens of a better
quality and cheaper cost than comparable French goods. The Iroquois
seemingly had a more equal, sibling relationship with the British, whom
the Indians called "Brethren"; in councils the Indians referred to French
58officials as "Father" indicating a more distant relationship. The
members of the League formed covenant chains of friendship with the
British, as they did in 1754 at the Albany Congress. These councils were
one way for colonists, especially British subjects such as Benjamin 
Franklin, to learn about the Iroquois "Tree of the Great Peace," formed 
and functioning for the Iroquois by the early seventeenth century.
"SIX NATIONS OF IGNORANT SAVAGES"
Certain British colonists such as Benjamin Franklin periodically
discussed this somewhat powerful "league of ragged villagers" in their
writings. Whether Franklin understood how the unwritten Iroquois
constitution of the "Great Peace" worked is questionable. He certainly
was not an ignorant eighteenth-century colonist. He knew what was
happening in the colonies and in England, and had a cosmopolitan rather
than a provincial outlook.
Much of Franklin's knowledge of the Iroquois came through his
primary occupation as a Philadelphia printer. From 1736 to 1762, he
copied and printed thirteen treaties made between various tribes and
several of the colonies. Prior to 1754, six of these treaties dealt
specifically with the Six Nations of the Iroquois. Five were drafted in
59Pennsylvania; the sixth conference took place in Albany. Because a
printer was familiar with what he was copying, Franklin probably learned 
the procedures followed by the Iroquois nations when they met in a 
conference to draft a treaty.
One such treaty negotiation was that held at Newtown, Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania, in June 1744. At that meeting, Canasatego, an 
Iroquois chief, advised the colonial ambassadors that the Iroquois were 
"a powerful Confederacy; and by your observing the same Methods, our Wise
Forefathers have taken, you will acquire such Strength and power.
60
Therefore whatever befalls you, never fall out with one another."
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Franklin probably learned more than procedures from printing Indian 
treaties; he also could become familiar with Iroquois thought and 
philosophy through the speeches of orators such as Canasatego.
When Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton appointed Franklin to a 
conference at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in September 1753, Hamilton 
presented the printer and assemblyman with his first opportunity to 
experience an Indian council first-hand. Along with Isaac Norris and 
Richard Peters, members of the assembly and the governor's council 
respectively, Franklin met with "Chiefs of the Ohio Indians," which 
included representatives of the Six Nations, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, 
and Wyandots.^
This conference began with a condolence ceremony to honor dead 
warriors of the Delawares and Miamis and to sympathize with the survivors 
and successors. Sympathy included more than mere words, however. The 
British brought gifts for these grieving tribes, who had lost chiefs and 
warriors to French soldiers. In these treaties, belts and strings of 
wampum took on a diplomatic purpose; although they were meant for 
condolence, they also stood for peace and unity among all nations 
present. The commissioners also heard speeches from the Indians. 
Scarouady, an Oneida representative of the Six Nations, spoke for all 
members of the League when he chastised the colonists for expanding their 
trade too far into Indian territory— they crossed the mountains— and for 
selling rum to the Indians. The Iroquois' oratory style was one of their 
strengths, and Scarouady showed the power of persuasion to reduce British 
trade: "The French look on the great Number of your Traders at Ohio with
Envy; they fear they shall lose their Trade. You have more Traders than
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are necessary.” The Indians requested that only three sets of traders
remain on Indian lands.
Despite Scarouady's plea to the colonists to stop the sale of
rum, the commissioners promised the Indians alcohol after they completed
the treaty. When the representatives concluded the treaty the Indians
got their rum, and Franklin remarked that they "form’d a Scene the most
6 3resembling our Ideas of Hell that could well be imagin'd." He referred
to the Indians at Carlisle as "Savages," a general term used by colonists
from the time of first contact in the late sixteenth century. At
Carlisle the expression possibly took on more meaning for Franklin.
Despite the impression left by the inebriated Indians, Franklin believed
that "the Treaty was conducted very orderly, and concluded to mutual 
64Satisfaction," possibly implying that the "Savages" had the capability 
to be worthy diplomats. References in the treaty to a "single Heart" 
among the Indians present and also to the "Six Nations Council" probably 
contributed to the colonists' realization of the need for unity among 
themselves.^
Aside from these few personal contacts with the Iroquois,
Franklin learned about their behavior and political structure through 
talking and corresponding with acquaintances who dealt with the Indians 
more frequently. His friend Conrad Weiser, the chief Indian interpreter 
for the colony of Pennsylvania, contributed to Franklin's knowledge. For 
the first sixteen years of Weiser's life, his family lived among the 
Mohawks, who adopted him as a brother. When he moved to Tulpehocken, 
Pennsylvania, in 1729, his earlier experiences led to his involvement in 
Indian affairs in the colony. He worked with Shickellamy, an Oneida
24
chief who lived at Shamokin at the forks of the Susquehanna River. 
Shickellamy acted as the League's representative in that area. The 
League entrusted him with observing the actions of the Pennsylvania 
Indians.^
Weiser, because of his position as "province interpreter," took 
an active part in most of the Indian treaties of the 1730s-1750s. He 
acted as interpreter at Lancaster in 1744, where he held a conversation 
with Canasatego; Franklin commented upon this conversation forty years 
later. In addition to the treaties in which Weiser had a role, Franklin 
also printed in pamphlet form a 1744 letter from Weiser to Thomas Lee, 
acting governor of Virginia, in which the interpreter gave his observa­
tions of the nature and culture of the Six Nations. Weiser*s comments do
6 7not include his own opinion about the Indians, however.
Weiser had a deep respect for the Iroquois and other Indian
nations with whom he had contact, and the respect was mutual. At the
1744 Lancaster treaty, an eyewitness, Witham Marshe, reported in detail.
He realized that "Mr. Weiser, the interpreter," was "highly esteemed by
the Indians, and is one of their council of state (though a German by
birth)." Weiser understood the Indians and asked that observers of the
treaty be sensitive to cultural differences. Marshe noted how "our
interpreter, Mr. Weiser, desired us, whilst we were here, not to talk
much of the Indians, nor to laugh at their dress, or make any remarks on 
68their behavior." At the conclusion of the Lancaster conference, repre­
sentatives present signed the treaty. Because of their admiration for 
him, Weiser was asked by the Six Nations to sign his new name, 
Tarachiawagon, as a representative of the Mohawks, who were absent.
25
Tarachiawagon was the name of the Holder of the Heavens, the ancient
69founder and protector of the Iroquois Confederacy.
Later, at the Albany Congress of 1754, Weiser worked to
reestablish the covenant chain between the Six Nations and the British.
He deeply resented an attack made on his integrity as an interpreter in
1754. In a pamphlet regarding a land sale "from the Six Nations to the
Proprietors" of Pennsylvania, Charles Thomson, a Philadelphia teacher,
accused Weiser of implementing a sale that had not been made in
accordance with the procedures of the Confederation Council. Weiser
vehemently replied to the "notorious Lye"; he found it unbelievable "that
the Person [himself] known to have a considerable Influence among the
Indians, made the Indians Sign a Release contrary to the Established
Costum [sic], and Usage of the Six Nations." He continued by condemning
70Thomson as a "Scoundrel & an Ignorant fellow in Indian Affairs."
Franklin worked with Weiser at the Albany Congress and knew of
his activities at Lancaster, but Franklin’s contacts with Weiser extended
to more than Indian affairs. Weiser had an account with Franklin's
printing office in Philadelphia, where the former bought books. Their
families had contact as well; the printer's son William accompanied
Weiser on a journey to the land of the Ohio Indians in 1748 to make the
71treaty of Logstown, during which time William kept a journal.
Another Indian agent, Sir William Johnson, who lived at Mount 
Johnson, New York, could have provided Franklin with excellent knowledge 
of the Iroquois League. Johnson lived and worked in Iroquoia as the 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Six Nations, appointed by 
Governor George Clinton of New York in 1743. In this position, Johnson
26
had regular contact with the Iroquois. Although Johnson was most
influential among the Mohawks, all of the Iroquois sachems seemed to
respect him. In 1751, at a Council at Albany held on July 2, Hendrick,
the Mohawk spokesman, informed the governor of the province of New York
that Johnson "has large Ears and heareth a great deal, and what he hears
he tells to us; he also has Large Eyes and sees a great way, and conceals
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nothing from us." All of the nations were angry when Johnson resigned
his position over a conflict with the provincial government and because
the British crown failed to subsidize his work. Hendrick lamented for
all of the nations that "his Excellency will be pleased to reinstate
73Coll. Johnson or else we expect to be ruined." In 1756 the crown
finally gave the Indians what they wanted and conferred on Johnson the
position of sole superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern
British colonies.
Johnson and Franklin did not correspond until 1755, but it seems
possible that Franklin would have been familiar with Johnson's work and
knowledge. Perhaps Franklin learned about Johnson through Weiser, since
74
the two agents occasionally corresponded.
Whereas Weiser and Johnson dealt directly with the Indians 
through councils and treaties, two others who may have influenced 
Franklin were merely observers of the Iroquois lifestyle. One, John 
Bartram, a Philadelphia botanist, accompanied Weiser on his trip to the 
country of the Six Nations in 1743. In addition to noticing plant life 
in New York, Bartram also noted the behavior of the Iroquois and their 
procedures in council meetings. He characterized the Six Nations as a 
"subtile, prudent, and judicious people in their councils, indefatigable,
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crafty, and revengeful in their wars, the men lazy and indolent at home."
They also appeared to be "grave, solid, and still in their recreations,
75
as well as m  their council." Bartram felt that the sachems were the
kind of men one could trust to keep their promises, as long as they were
given presents. He seemed to be impressed with their "perfect union" by
which "their forefathers had conquered their enemies, were respected by
76their allies, and honoured by all the world." If Franklin read that
statement and believed it, it is no wonder that he would desire to form
another such union between the British colonies.
Franklin probably read Bartram's Observations. They lived near
each other, and both were original members of the American Philosophical
Society, founded in Philadelphia in 1744; Franklin served as secretary of
the Society. According to Carolus Linnaeus, a Swedish botanist, Bartram
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was the greatest "natural botanist" in the world. Bartram visited
Cadwallader Colden, one of Franklin's New York acquaintances, in
September 1753, and Colden described Bartram in a letter to Franklin in
78
1754 as "our friend Bartram." Before Franklin published his
"Observations concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, 
etc.," he sent copies to Bartram and Colden for their opinions. Since 
both men knew each other as early as 1744, it seems likely that Franklin 
may have learned something about the Iroquois from Bartram, particularly 
after the latter's trip north.
In 1743 Franklin met Cadwallader Colden, a member of the New York 
Council and surveyor-general of New York. Colden lived in the Catskill 
Mountains of New York adjacent to Iroquois lands, and south of Mount 
Johnson, the home of Sir William. In March 1749 Colden's son John went
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to Albany to take office as clerk, and Colden trusted to Johnson's
"friendship in giving advice on any emergency that may happen[.] The
present circumstances of affairs makes me think it improper to recommend
79him [John] to any other of my acquaintances at this time." That May
Colden wrote to Johnson asking for assistance for an acquaintance, 
Professor Peter Kalm, who was traveling north. Kalm wanted to know the
safest route to Canada, where he hoped to study botany and astronomy.
Colden realized that Johnson knew the northern areas better than Colden 
did.80
A man of many talents and interests, Colden studied science, 
agriculture, and physics. In 1727 he wrote a History of the Five Indian 
Nations, which he filled with descriptions of the Iroquois, their coun­
cils, and the League in general. Colden respected the Iroquois and their 
"Genius in the Arts of negotiating." He found it intriguing that "a 
barbarous People, without any of the Arts and Sciences in which we value
our selves," could "manage their Interest with the most learned, most
81polite, and artificial Nation in Europe."
Colden wrote about the League of Five Nations, disregarding the
sixth, the Tuscaroras. He described the League as "many Tribes or
Nations, joined together by a League or Confederacy . . . and without any
Superiority of the one over the other. This Union has continued so long,
82that the Christians know nothing of the original of it." He further
explained how each nation was an "absolute Republick by itself," but how
"Matters of Consequence, which concern all the Nations, [were] transacted
83
in a general Meeting of the Sachems of each Nation." He admired the 
Five Nations because they "have such absolute notions of Liberty, that
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they allow of no Kind of Superiority of one over another, and banish all
84Servitude from their Territories." According to Colden, theirs was a
"perfect Republican Government." This idea also could have been in
Franklin's mind when he formed his ideas for the Albany Plan.
Franklin and Colden corresponded frequently, and Colden*s letters
appear in Franklin's writings. The printer apparently respected Colden's
opinion; he showed his plans for union to Colden and two other New York
acquaintances on his way to the Albany Congress. Colden, who also
favored a union of the colonies but did not attend the Albany Congress,
commented on the plans and made his own suggestions. Franklin regretted
Colden's absence from the Congress, writing, "We could have had your
Presence and Assistance both in the Treaty [with the Iroquois] and in
85forming the Plan."
Just as Franklin had friends and acquaintances who devoted much
of their time to the Indians, he and other colonists understandably
shared similar attitudes toward the native Americans. The "noble savage"
concept of the French philsophers and the theory of natural rights
prevailed in many minds during the Enlightenment of the eighteenth
century, and balanced any racism evident as well. As early as the first
contact with the American natives, Europeans referred to those they met
and heard about as "savages" and "barbarians." John Smith, for example,
repeatedly wrote about the "Salvages" as early as 1607, and William
86Strachey called them such in 1612. In 1648 the directors of the Dutch 
West India Company used "savages" in reference to the natives near New 
Netherland. According to Francis Jennings, a twentieth-century 
historian, "savages" was an English translation for the Dutch "wilden", a
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term intended for the natives of a country who possessed laws and
religion, and differed from heathen or Negroes; the Europeans sometimes
87
called the natives "Wilde Indians." Franklin came from a long line of
Europeans whose terms for the Indians probably connoted more favorable
meanings than they did for Europeans and Euro-Americans of later 
88
centuries. Franklin's biographer, Carl Van Doren, has described the
printer's perspective on the Indian as neither anthropological nor
romantic. Franklin had a definite curiosity about the "Savages," and he
89enjoyed commenting on their behavior. Before he printed the Newtown
Treaty of 1744, he wrote to William Strahan, an English friend, promising
that he would "send . . .  an account of it when printed, as the method of
doing business with these barbarians may perhaps afford you some 
90amusement."
As early as 1747 Franklin noted the strength of the Six Nations
in "Plain Truth: or Serious Considerations on the Present State of the
City of Philadelphia, and Province of Pennsylvania." He jealously
explained how the French knew "the Power and Importance of the Six
Nations," and spared "no Artifice, Pains or Expence, to gain them to
91their Interest." With this firm observation of the importance of the 
Iroquois in the colonial system, Benjamin Franklin directly hinted that 
the British had better take a lesson from the French. The Six Nations' 
confederation must have seemed quite impressive to merit such attention.
Although he referred to the native Americans with the common term 
"Savages," Franklin seemed to admire their way of life and to respect 
their accomplishments. He wrote one of his best-known comments to James 
Parker on March 20, 1751:
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It would be a very strange Thing, if Six Nations of 
ignorant Savages should be capable of forming a Scheme for 
such an Union, and be able to execute it in such a Manner, 
as that it has subsisted Ages, and appears indissoluble: 
and yet that a like Union should be impracticable for ten 
or a Dozen English Colonies, to whom it is more necessary, 
and must be more advantageous; and who cannot be ^pposed 
to want an equal Understanding of their Interests.
Three years later Franklin formed a plan of union for the "ten or a Dozen
English Colonies." Although he did not refer to this statement at the
Albany Congress in 1754, he still may have felt that if the "ignorant
Savages" could firmly establish such a successful union, so could he and
the colonists.
Two years after the letter to Parker, Franklin again expressed
his admiration for the Iroquois in a letter to Peter Collinson, a London
merchant, dated May 9, 1753. Franklin described how the Indians who
preferred a life of freedom and ease had resisted attempts to civilize
them. Although the native Americans were "not deficient in natural
understanding," and visited "civilized" societies frequently to see their
advantages, they still showed no "inclination to change their manner of
93life for ours, or to learn any of our arts." Franklin told Collinson 
how white captives of the Indians who were rescued from their captivity 
often became "disgusted with our manner of life" and escaped back into 
the woods.
In 1784 Franklin commented on a conversation between the Iroquois 
chief Canasatego and Conrad Weiser held at the Lancaster conference in 
1744. Franklin admired the way that both conducted themselves at the 
conference and added some of his ideas about Indian behavior. His 
writing again showed his admiration for Iroquois government, which was 
run "by Counsel of the Sages." He marveled that "there is no Force,
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there are no Prisons, no Officers to compel Obedience, or inflict
Punishment." He sincerely respected the Indians' councils and felt that
94they had "acquired great Order and Decency in conducting them." An
astute observer with an eye for the unusual or extraordinary, Franklin
singled out the record-keeping duties of the women and the oratorical
style of the men when in council. Indian hospitality impressed him as
well, and he concluded that "if we could examine the manners of different
nations with impartiality we should find no people so rude as to be
without any rules of politeness, nor any so polite as not to have some
remains of rudeness.
Even later, in 1797, Franklin set down his "Remarks Concerning
the Savages of North America," ideas acquired over many years. He
complimented the Indians on their polite conversation and "Civility," and
even felt that their politeness in conversation was "carried to Excess,
since it does not permit them to contradict or deny the Truth of what is
asserted in their Presence. By this means they indeed avoid Disputes;
but then it becomes difficult to know their Minds, or what Impression you
96made upon them." Franklin may have thought some Indian actions to be
barbarous, but he admired the Indians' life of freedom and some of their
political and social accomplishments.
Along with most colonial officials of the time, Franklin saw the
need for the British to support the Indians in order to receive their
support in return. On December 6, 1753, in a comment similar to that in
"Plain Truth," he wrote to Cadwallader Colden emphasizing the British
need to undersell the French by furnishing the Indians with cheap goods,
97
thereby attaching "the Indians more firmly to the British interest."
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Immediately after the Albany Congress he wrote to Peter Collinson that
"no Assistance is to be expected from [the Six Nations] in any Dispute
with the French, 'till by a compleat Union among our selves we are
98enabled to support them in case they should be attacked."
Through his few experiences and by his many acquaintances,
Franklin acquired some knowledge of the Six Nations. He apparently knew
about their political dealings with other tribes. At least William
Clarke, a Boston physician and political writer, thought so, or he would
not have asked for Franklin's advice in a letter of March 18, 1754.
Clarke wrote to inquire "What Tribes of Indians are in Alliance with the
Six Nations, what Number they are computed at, the Number of the Six
Nations themselves, [and] whether all the Tribes of Indians in alliance
99with the Six Nations are likewise in Alliance with the English." 
Clarke referred to John Patten, an Indian trader who worked on the Ohio 
River and seemed fairly experienced in the Ohio country. Surely Clarke
inflated Franklin's ego when he compared the printer with the trader and
told Franklin that "I beleive [sic] you know the state of most of these 
Facts better your self, than he can."^^ Clarke probably did not know 
the degree of knowledge and understanding that Franklin held of the inner 
workings of the League’s structure. Certain colonists like Franklin 
tried to understand and deal with the Indians, while others would try to 
use the Indians to further their goals of wealth and power in North 
America.
"ONE DIRECTION, ONE COUNCIL, ONE PURSE"— THE ALBANY CONGRESS
Major political events prior to 1754 centered around the growing
conflict between the British and the French over westward expansion. The
object of both rivals was to seize new territory, maintain their trade
routes, and influence the Indian tribes to extend trade relations and to
101make treaties of alliance. The Ohio Company, formed by certain enter­
prising individuals in the colony of Virginia in 1747, allowed the Ohio
Valley to be opened to settlers. The British government hoped that this
private company would serve to extend royal Virginia beyond the 
102
Alleghenies. The rival colonies expanded in different ways. Whereas
the British advanced slowly and steadily and tended to maintain a
distinct line of settlements, the French moved more rapidly, following
the rivers and lake systems of the St. Lawrence and Mississippi and
establishing a chain of trading posts connecting Canada with
. . 103
Louisiana. Whereas the British pushed the Indians ahead or aside as
the colonists established settlements, the French allowed the Indians to 
dwell among them.
While moving into new lands, both European powers intensified
their efforts to maintain and extend their Indian alliances. The Six 
Nations were central to this tug-of-war, for they controlled some of the 
tribes that lay north of the Ohio River, the prime region for colonial 
expansion. A meeting between the British and the Twightwee or Miami 
Indians at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1748 resulted in an agreement to
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work together against the French. Later in that year, in a treaty at
Logstown in the Ohio region, the Ohio tribes lent their support to the
British. The British held further meetings with the Indians in the
following years to strengthen their position in the northern and western 
104
lands. They controlled more of the Indian trade than did the French.
Because British occupied the coast and established settlements, they
developed trade centers; they generally furnished a better lot of goods
105and at times undersold the French.
The French political and social fabric initially appeared to be
weak. According to William Clarke, who wrote to Franklin in May 1754,
"the French Forts are of no Consequence, but as it gives them the
Advantage of gaining the Indians . their building Forts at such
distances from the places from whence they must d^raw their supplies . . .
106must . . rather weaken them." The Iroquois, however, realized the
growing strength of the French, who "are Men, they are fortifying
everywhere— but, we are ashamed to say it, you [British] are all like
107women bare and open without fortifications." As French influence
grew, the British government naturally became concerned. But British
colonial governments could not unite easily for matters of offense or
defense because they had no method for joint action, and the
particularism and narrow-mindedness that characterized the individual
108
colonial assemblies made the situation less than desirable.
By mid-century certain colonists and British officials began to 
consider seriously the need for some type of union. One colonist in 
particular, Archibald Kennedy, developed a plan in 1751 that dealt mainly 
with Indian affairs. Kennedy, the King's Receiver General and a member
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of the governor's council in New York, wrote a pamphlet in which he urged
the British government to adopt a unified policy toward the Indians in
109order to keep them from aligning with the French. A year earlier, he
expressed a similar concern in Observations on the Importance of the 
Northern Colonies under Proper Regulations: "The French know their
Interest, and will pursue it. That we ever should be able to
recover our Indians, is much to be doubted; and if ever the French become 
absolute Masters of the Indians, adieu to our English Settlements."'*'"*’^  
In both of these pamphlets, Kennedy urged the need for union in order to 
conduct colonial defense. He realized the inadequacies of the colonial 
assemblies and their stinginess with their treasuries. So he stressed
that "nothing, therefore, but a British Parliament, can put this Affair
_ ,,111 upon a proper Footing."
By 1754 French threats alarmed the colonies and underlined the
need for a plan of action. Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia ordered
the building of a fort at the forks of the Ohio River in 1753. In New
York, British ineptness at defense irritated the Mohawks, and worried
112officials in the mother country. Realizing the problems mounting in
America, the Board of Trade, the body in England that administered the 
colonies, called a meeting to be held at Albany, New York, in June 1754.
They chose this site because of its proximity to the major Indian lands
in question.
The British government also realized that a union of the colo­
nists was necessary. On July 5, 1754, the Board of Trade wrote to
Governor James DeLancey of New York that "it seem's to be the opinion and 
is the language of almost every colony that a general Union of strength
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and interest is become absolutely necessary [.] nothing could have
facilitated such a measure more than a general Congress of Commissioners
113from each Colony at Albany."
Earlier in the year, the Lords recommended that then-New York
governor, Danvers Osborne, call a conference with the Six Nations and
send invitations to the governors of the colonies from New Hampshire to
Virginia. At the death of Osborne, Lieutenant Governor James DeLancey
sent the letters to the governors, asking them to choose delegates who
114were particularly acquainted with Indian affairs. The Virginia and
New Jersey assemblies were preoccupied with other matters and did not
want to get involved at the time; Rhode Island and Connecticut delegates
came, having received a late invitation. In Pennsylvania, Governor
James Hamilton appointed John Penn, Richard Peters, Isaac Norris, and
Benjamin Franklin, all government officials, and the Assembly approved
them and their expenses on April 12, 1754. Governor Shirley of
115Massachusetts encouraged other governors to send delegates.
The instructions requested the twenty-four delegates from seven
colonies to gather in Albany on June 14. A number of governors and
assemblies sent instructions with their commissioners, describing what
116they hoped would be accomplished at Albany. The conference goals sum­
marily included a renewal of the general alliance between the British 
colonies and the Indian tribes south of the Great Lakes; the construction 
of forts to halt French intrusions on Indian lands and to encourage the 
British Indian trade; and ultimately the execution of these measures by a
loose confederation formed by the colonies, rather than by the British
117Parliament, contrary to Archibald Kennedy's suggestion.
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Because the Indians arrived five days late, the Albany Congress
commenced on June 19, with James DeLancey, acting governor, presiding.
At the first session, the Congress immediately plunged into the Indian
business by reading the minutes of previous meetings with the Indians at
Albany. Prior to the conference, the Commissioners of Indian Affairs met
and concluded "that the most effectual method to retain and secure the
Six Nations to the British Interest, will be to build two Forts, one on
118
the Onondaga, the other in the Seneca Country."
Through the duration of the Congress the delegates and the In­
dians exchanged gifts and presented speeches; Conrad Weiser served as
interpreter. The Indians proved honest in their criticisms of both the 
French and the British. Hendrick, the Indian spokesman, replied that the 
"Covenant Chain" that bound the Indians with the British government had 
to be renewed. But he angrily told the delegates that the British had
neglected the Iroquois for three years: "You have thus thrown us behind
your back," he said, "and disregarded us, whereas the French are a subtle
and vigilant people, ever using their utmost endeavors to seduce and
119bring our people over to them." He also complained about the British
practice of making "paths through our Country to Trade and [building]
120houses without acquainting us with it." The Lords of Trade seemed to
agree. In a letter they also criticized the way in which New York had
dealt with the Iroquois. Hendrick reminded the commissioners of the
"Ancient glory of the Five Nations," and DeLancey expressed the hope that
the colonies would become "as powerful and famous" as the Iroquois "were
^  ,,121 of old.
The outcome of the talks, which lasted through July 9, was a
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general treaty, one like those that preceded it. The Indians renewed the
"Covenant Chain" with the British, giving a belt of wampum "to clear away,
all Clouds that we may all live in bright sunshine, and keep together in
strict union and friendship; then we shall become strong and nothing can 
122hurt us." According to Robert Newbold, a student of the Albany
Congress, one lasting result of the meeting was the emphasis on placing
Indian affairs under British authority. In 1756 the Lords appointed
123William Johnson sole superintendent of northern Indian affairs. 
Besides the general^ treaty renewal and the British commitment to 
construct fortifications, the conference decided no specific Indian 
issues.
While the talks with the Indians progressed, the Congress formed 
two committees for different purposes. One committee's job was to draft 
a "representation of the present state of the colonies." This "Represen­
tation" would confirm the British territorial claims in North America 
made at the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, following Queen Anne's War. The 
purpose of the "Representation" was to indicate the encroachments of the 
French since the treaty was made. The resulting report, finished by 
Thomas Hutchinson, indicated many of the same problems evident in the de­
bates with the Iroquois— the defenseless condition of the British colo­
nies, their neglect of the Iroquois, the fraudulent land grants, and the 
ill effects of rum on the Indians. The report then proposed to deal with 
these evils, to establish forts on the frontier, to limit the existing 
boundaries of the British colonies at the Appalachian Mountains, to gain 
control over the Great Lakes, and to form a union, so that the combined 
resources of the British colonies could be used "against their common
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,,124 enemy."
To form a plan of union, the Congress established a second
committee comprised of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Hutchinson, Theodore
Atkinson, who kept a detailed "Memo Book" at the conference, and four
125
others. At the conference ten days earlier, a "motion was made, that
the commiss'rs deliver their opinion, whether a Union of all the colonies
is not at present absolutely necessary for their security and
126
defence." The vote passed unanimously for the formation of such a
plan, and each colony chose one of its delegates to serve on the 
committee to review suggestions. The "representation" document served to 
support the committee's goals in forming a plan of union.
Most of the delegates did not bring explicit instructions to form 
a union of the colonies; only Governor Shirley of Massachusetts had 
instructed his delegates to do so. Therefore, when the commissioners de­
cided to form a plan of union, almost all of them exceeded their
127
delegated powers. Some of the commissioners proposed that the
colonies be divided into two or three separate unions. In the final
plan, however, the committee decided against such a proposal. They felt
that the "strength of the whole was necessary to be used against the
enemy" and the colonies could support each other if they were in the 
128fight together. The committee also set down in its final draft the
"Reasons and Motives on which the Plan of Union was formed," concluding
"that an union of the colonies is absolutely necessary for their 
129preservation."
Certain delegates played key roles in the plan's formation. One 
was Benjamin Franklin, who developed the idea for a union of the colonies
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several years before the British government called the Albany Congress. 
In 1751 he wrote to James Parker in reaction to Archibald Kennedy's
pamphlet, The Importance of Gaining and Preserving the Friendship of the 
Indians. Franklin felt that a union was necessary to conduct Indian af­
fairs, but that a union could not be established by royal governors 
because they did not always see "eye to eye" with the assemblies. 
Instead, it should be formed by a select group of men who would be
furnished with instructions from the assemblies; the men would be sent to 
the various colonies to promote the scheme. In that way,
such an union might thereby be made and established. . . .
A voluntary union entered into by the colonies themselves,
I think, would be preferable to one imposed by Parliament; 
for it would be perhaps not much more difficult to
procure, and more easy to alter and impro^^Q as
circumstances should require and experience direct.
This 1751 letter included Franklin's celebrated "Six Nations" remark; his
plan called for an intercolonial council for Indian affairs and defense,
with a governor at its head. Money would be raised by an excise tax on
strong liquors, and the number of delegates for each colony would depend
131on the amount it paid into the general treasury.
No other mention of a plan of union appeared in Franklin's wri­
tings until 1754. On May 9, Franklin printed a cartoon in his Phila­
delphia newspaper, the Pennsylvania Gazette. The cartoon was of a snake, 
cut up into eight pieces, each marked for a colonial area— New England, 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
and South Carolina. The caption read "Join, or Die." With his cartoon, 
Franklin responded to the French capture of the Virginia fort at the 
forks of the Ohio. He commented that "the confidence of the French in 
this undertaking seems well-grounded in the present disunited state of
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the British colonies, and the extreme difficulty of bringing so many dif­
ferent governments and assemblies to agree to any speedy and effectual 
measures for our common defence and security; while our enemies have the
great advantage of being under one direction, with one council, and one
,.132 purse."
On his way to Albany to attend the conference, the printer had
drafted a plan which he showed to a few acquaintances— James Alexander, a
member of the New York council, Cadwallader Colden, surveyor general of
New York, and Archibald Kennedy. Franklin's "Short Hints towards a
Scheme for Uniting the Northern Colonies" was not much different from his
1751 scheme. However, by 1754 he had come to realize that the
involvement of Parliament was necessary. The scheme, "being first well
considered and improved by the Commissioners at Albany," was "to be sent
133home, and an Act of Parliament obtain'd for establishing it."
When Franklin arrived at Albany, the Pennsylvania delegation
chose him as its member on the committee to form the plan of union. He
presented his "Short Hints" to the committee, and "it then appear'd that
134several of the Commissioners had form'd Plans of the same kind." The
committee met and debated the ideas for a plan of union at the same time
that the councils with the Iroquois occurred. Unfortunately, the
planning committee left no records of its sessions. All that survives
is the draft of its "Short Hints towards a Scheme for a General Union of
the British Colonies on the Continent," which closely resembles
Franklin's "Short Hints." Franklin wrote the final draft of the Plan of
135.
Union from this committee document. On July 14, 1754, he wrote to
Colden: "The Commissioners agreed on a Plan of Union of 11 Colonies
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. . . the same with that of which I sent you the Hints, some few
136
Particulars excepted." However, Franklin's "scheme" was not the only
one presented to the committee. He indicated that other commissioners 
had formed plans similar to his, but no record indicates whether these 
plans were written or oral, or whose ideas they represented.
Another plan could have been brought by the Reverend Richard 
Peters, a delegate from Pennsylvania. His "A Plan for a General Union of 
the British Colonies of North America," dated only "1754", was almost en­
tirely military in organization. The continental colonies, excluding the 
distant region of Nova Scotia, would be organized into four geographical 
divisions, each of which would provide a contingent for a "union
regiment." The plan was never adopted and probably had little influence
137on the resulting document at Albany.
Thomas Hutchinson, another member of the committee, also had a
role in the formation of the Albany Plan. When the Congress ended,
Hutchinson wrote that "the plan for a general union was projected by
138
Benjamin Franklin." But in 1769 he wrote to Governor Francis Bernard
of Massachusetts that "at the congress at Albany in 1754 I was in favor
of an Union of the govts for certain Purposes & I drew the Plan which was 
139
then accepted." This was the only time Hutchinson claimed to have
authored the final plan, but in three other instances he named Franklin 
as the author, indicating that Franklin probably played the major role. 
Hutchinson's biographer, Bernard Bailyn, seemed to be convinced that at 
the Albany Congress, the Massachusetts representative "had shared with
Franklin the leadership in planning a union of American colonies under
. . 140
British control." Years later, Hutchinson wrote in his Diary:
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The same famous Dr. Franklin was one of the Commissioners 
from Pensilvania. He with Mr. Hutchinson, were the 
Committee who drew up the plan of Union, and the 
representation of the state of the Colonies. The former 
was the projection of D r . F., and prepared in part before 
he had any consultation with Mr. H., probably brought with 
him from Philadelphia; the latter [i.e., "The
Representation"] was the draught of Mr. H.
Conceivably, Hutchinson did contribute oral plans to the work of
the committee, based on his own personal feelings and on the political
climate in Massachusetts. Hutchinson wanted to keep Great Britain and
her colonies together; some power must have control of the colonies, he
142felt, and that power should be British. Also, Massachusetts Bay was
the only colony in which the governor had instructed his delegates to
"enter into articles of union and confederation for the general defence
143of his Majesty's subjects and interests in North America." Governor
Shirley described his ideas in letters to the other governors. His plan
included the control of Indian affairs, the building of forts, and the
taxation of the colonies by Parliament, issues similar to those in other 
144
plans. If Hutchinson brought Shirley's views to the committee,
Franklin might have integrated them into the Albany Plan.
This is what historian Lawrence Henry Gipson believed happened. 
Gipson cited evidence for the existence of two other plans in his article 
"Thomas Hutchinson and the Framing of the Albany Plan of Union, 1754." 
Both plans, from the Connecticut Historical Society Collections, limited 
a union to the northern colonies; one seems to have been largely an 
amended form of the other. Gipson argued that the final copy of the 
Albany Plan more closely resembled both of these plans in content, as 
well as in language and style, than it did Franklin's "Short Hints". 
Franklin admitted that his plan was not adopted in whole in a letter to
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Peter Collinson on December 29, 1754: "For tho' I projected the Plan and
drew it, I was oblig'd to alter some Things contrary to my Judgment or
should never have been able to carry it through." And later, in his
Autobiography in 1788, he wrote about his contribution: "A Committee was
then appointed . to consider the several plans and report. Mine
happen'd to be preferr'd, and, with a few Amendments, was accordingly 
145reported." It appears, then, that a portion of the resulting Albany
Plan of Union was not the product of Franklin, but of Hutchinson or
146someone from Massachusetts.
Nevertheless, Franklin reported his final draft on July 10 as he
was instructed. The Congress debated it and resolved, with some
opposition, "that the Commissioners from the several Governments be
desired to lay the same before their respective constituents for their
consideration." The secretary was to forward copies to those governors
who were absent.1^7
In essence, and in Franklin's words, the Albany Plan "was to be
administered by a president-general, appointed and supported by the
crown, and a grand council was to be chosen by the representatives of the
148people of the several colonies, met in their respective assemblies."
The Plan covered such topics as Indian trade, land purchases from 
Indians, new settlements, peace and war preparations, the method for 
raising soldiers, the manner of forming legislation, and the appointment 
of officers (see Appendix I).
Franklin's thoughts on the Albany Plan of Union reveal his firm 
belief that the colonies needed to work together. In his July 14, 1754, 
letter to Cadwallader Colden, Franklin expressed his wish that "the Union
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may be approv'd of by the Assemblies of the several Colonies, and
149
confirmed by the King and Parliament." Again, in his letter of July
29 to Peter Collinson, a London merchant, Franklin expressed his concern 
that
in my Opinion no Assistance is to be expected from [the 
Indians of the Six Nations] in any Dispute with the 
French, 'till by a compleat Union among our selves we are 
enabled support them in case they should be
attacked.
After the representatives approved of the Plan of Union, they
took it home with them to be considered in their assemblies. In
Pennsylvania, Governor Hamilton expressed his approval of the document
and recommended it to the Assembly. But when they took up the plan, in
Franklin's absence, they "reprobated it without paying any attention to
151it at all, to my no small mortification." Ironically, some of those
men who had supported it at the Congress failed to approve it at home.
None of the other assemblies approved the plan either. In December,
Franklin resigned himself to the fact that the plan would not be accepted
by the colonial assemblies. In his December letter to Collinson, he
wrote: "Every Body cries, a Union is absolutely necessary; but when they
come to the Manner and Form of the Union, their weak Noddles are
152
presently distracted." As early as May 1754, Doctor William Clarke,
Franklin's Boston friend, had written of the necessity of union and of
the present discord:
This union is hardly to be expected to be brought about by 
a confederacy or voluntary agreement, among ourselves.
The jealousies the colonies have of each other . . . will 
effectively hinder any thing of this kind from taking 
place.
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The assemblies rejected the Plan for a number of reasons, all of
which seemed to indicate narrowmindedness and a lack of cooperation on
their parts. They did not want the taxing power to be in the hands of a
federation. Certain colonies such as Pennsylvania and Virginia were in
154
competition with each other over lands in the Ohio Valley. Rhode
Island and Connecticut opposed the plan because it would have infringed
on the privileges which their strong charter governments gave to them.
And New Jersey, one colony that did not send commissioners, responded
that while a union was necessary, a place should be made in the federal
155
legislature for the contribution of colonial councils.
In defense of his plan, Franklin wrote to Governor Shirley on
December 18, 1754, lamenting that "the powers proposed by the Albany Plan
of Union, . are not so great as those the colonies of Rhode Island
and Connecticut are entrusted with by their charters, and have never 
156abused." In another letter to Shirley four days later, Franklin
indicated that the union probably would be acceptable to the colonial
assemblies if they could have representatives in Parliament. In that way
the people of Great Britain and the people of the colonies "would learn
to consider themselves, as not belonging to a different community with
157
different interests, but to one community with one interest."
Some colonies waited to decide against the plan until they 
learned how it was received in England. In the meantime, on June 14,
1754, King George II asked the Board of Trade to prepare a plan of its
own for the common defense of the colonies. The Board reported its "Plan 
of General Concert" to the king on August 9. This plan included a method 
for maintaining forts and raising troops if necessary, and an appointment
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158of a commander-in-chief to control Indian affairs and defense. With a
note of sarcasm, Franklin wrote to Cadwallader Colden on August 30: "Our
Assembly [Pennsylvania] were not inclined to show any approbation of the
[Albany] plan of union; yet I suppose they will take no steps to oppose
159[the Board's] being established by the government at home." The Board
of Trade did not even recommend the Albany Plan to the king. Franklin
wrote: "The Assemblies . . . all thought there was too much prerogative
in it, and in England it was judg'd to have too much of the 
160democratic." However, the Lords of Trade did express regret in a July
5 letter to Lieutenant Governor DeLancey:
We cannot however but express our surprize and concern 
that after the proper arguments which you made use of to 
induce the neighboring Colonys to concur in the treaty 
with the Six Nations any of these Colonys should at this 
conjuncture have declined joining in a measure so 
apparej^y for the general interest and security of the 
whole.
Franklin feared the Board's alteration of the Albany Plan. He
felt that royal intervention would lead the colonists to suspect the
royal governors and councils, and to believe that their representatives
in the assemblies would have no influence; confusion and animosity would 
162
result. He had acquiesced, however, when he wrote to Peter Collinson
in December that "if ever there be an Union, it must be form'd at home by
the Ministry and Parliament. I doubt not but they will make a good one,
163and I wish it may be done this Winter." The Board's plan did not go
into effect that winter. In fact, war broke out in 1754, with the defeat
of George Washington's troops at Fort Necessity, and the plan never was
executed. The Board adopted only one feature— they agreed to appoint a
164commander-in-chief and two commissioners of Indian affairs.
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In writing his Autobiography two decades later, Franklin summed
up the positive aspects of his plan and its far-reaching implications.
He knew that it "was really the true medium," and he was
still of opinion it would have been happy for both sides 
the water if it had been adopted. The colonies, so 
united, would have been sufficiently strong to have 
defended themselves; there would have been no need of 
troops from England; of course, the subsequent pretence 
for taxing America, and the bloody contest it occasioned, 
would have been avoided. But such mistakes are noj^^ew; 
history is full of the errors of states and princes.
"THE ERRORS OF STATES AND PRINCES"
Errors are not exclusive to states and princes; historians are
also susceptible. Thomas Bailey defined a historical myth as "an account
166
or belief that is demonstrably untrue, in whole or substantial part."
Bailey's definition appears sound. The important point remains that
Franklin never stated that the Iroquois League was his model for the
Albany Plan of Union.
Historians and textbook writers cited earlier seemed to want to
imply more. Felix Cohen hinted that Franklin was aware of the League
model and considered its strengths when he wrote the Albany Plan.
Wilbur Jacobs thought along similar lines. Perhaps Cohen and Jacobs saved
themselves, however; neither one ever directly stated that Franklin based
his plan on the "Great Peace." The textbook published by the Educational
Research Council of America stated that Franklin used the example of the
League in drawing up his plan. In Bailey's definition, this is a belief
that is untrue, at least in substantial part, because Franklin did not
say that he used it, nor did any of his contemporaries.
Other twentieth-century writers such as Franklin's principal
biographer, Carl Van Doren, trod more carefully in discussing the matter
of the influence of the Iroquois League. Van Doren wrote that Franklin
"plainly had it in mind in his earliest discussion of the need of union
167
among the colonies." And Franklin apparently did have it in mind in
1751, when he conceived of his earliest plan. Bruce Johansen, who sought
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connections wherever he could, admitted that "the Iroquois were not the
only American Indians to develop notions of federalism and
democracy," and "Benjamin Franklin was not the only Euro-American to
168combine his own heritage with what he found in his new homeland." Un­
fortunately, Donald Grinde failed to take into account any other possible 
sources for Franklin's influence. So enamored was he with his Indian 
subject that he failed to see the truth in his sources. He based all of 
his implications and even his statements of "fact" on Franklin's remark 
of 1751. Franklin never made a similar statement in 1754; at least, none 
was published in any of his extant writings.
Besides the fact that Franklin never admitted to using the League 
as a model, a number of other reasons exist that show that the plan did
not, and could not, directly follow the League in structure. These
include the general dissimilarities in the two plans and in the Indian 
and English cultures, the inadequacies in Benjamin Franklin's
understanding of the Iroquois people and their way of life, and the
introduction of the ideas of others into the Albany Plan, creating doubts 
and suspicions as to the Plan's authorship.
The Albany Plan exhibits certain similarities with the Iroquois 
League, but crucial differences are obvious as well. The League's 
constitution myth evolved by 1600, while the Albany Plan became a part of 
history in July 1754. Still, their creators produced both for the same 
general purposes— defense and the creation of strength in numbers. In 
Franklin's "Reasons and Motives on which the Plan of Union was formed,"
he resolved "That an union of the colonies is absolutely necessary for
169
their preservation." He recognized the disputes and quarrels between
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the colonies and even between the assemblies and councils within the
individual colonies, and he knew that the French were encouraged to
invade British North America because of the colonies' disunion.
Similarly, Dekanawidah wanted to stop the quarreling between the Iroquois
nations and to form a union for strength against enemies.
However, the organization of and decision-making processes in the
two plans present more contrasts than similarities. Both tried to
guarantee the independence of their members. The Albany Plan allowed
170"each colony [to] retain its present constitution," except in certain
cases where the plan changed the situation; the plan had the potential to
place requirements on its member colonies, which the League did not. 
Both plans signified a place for meetings— Onondaga for the Iroquois and 
Philadelphia for the British. Also, both made provisions for the 
transfer of power from one representative to the next, and provided for 
the choice of a new representative if one should die or become
incapacitated.
However, the Albany Plan provided for a Grand Council to be 
chosen every three years by representatives of the people in their assem­
blies, and for a President-General to be appointed by the crown. The 
Council members of the "Great Peace" were not elected, but were selected 
from specific clans by clan matrons, who consulted popular opinion. The
"Great Peace" actually described in detail the types of men suited for
171"lordship" and the restrictions placed upon them. In the League
structure, the Thadodaho came closest to the English office of President- 
General. But the Thadodaho held an honorary office; although he had to 
be present for a decision to be reached, his "de jure" powers did not
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approach those of the President-General. He could not dissolve or 
prorogue the League Council without its consent, a check on the powers of 
this office.
In the financial sphere, the Albany Plan placed greater emphasis
on money matters. Both plans provided for a general treasury. The funds
in the treasuries came from member nations/colonies and, in the case of
the Iroquois, from dependent tribes. Whereas the League treasury derived
from gifts, the Albany Plan gave its Council the power to levy taxes on
the colonies "as shall appear most equal and just . . and such as may
172be collected with the least inconvenience to the people." The plan's
Grand Council would appoint a general treasurer, an office apparently not
deemed necessary in the League; in Iroquoia, one of the Onondaga chiefs
kept the League's wampum. Wampum, however, was not spent like the
colonists' coins. Instead, as mentioned earlier, it became the League's
archives, and according to Iroquois scholar Elisabeth Tooker, "it was not
regarded as money by the Indians, except that being something valuable it
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could be used for economic exchange and for gifts." The Albany Plan's
provisions granted an allowance of ten shillings a day and travel
expenses to the Council members. Finally, the Albany Plan allocated a
colony's number of representatives "according to the proportion it
contributed to the general treasury," although each could not have more
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than seven nor less than two representatives. The Iroquois knew no
such concept of saving funds and compensating representatives 
financially, although the host of a condolence council was expected to 
provide drink and a feast.
In the sphere of defense and warfare, both plans reflected the
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ways in which the societies desired to handle war. Although the "Great
Peace" laid down procedures for League warfare, it freed the individual
nations to fight their own wars. The Albany Plan provided that the
colonies be able to defend themselves too, so it mandated the Grand
Council to help pay a colony's individual war expenses, if the expenses
were deemed "just and reasonable." Franklin in his "Reasons and Motives"
felt that it was "necessary to encourage colonies to defend themselves,
X 76as the expence would be light when borne by the whole." According to
the plan, the President-General would nominate military officers, subject
to the approval of the Council. In this way, the people of the colonies
should feel as if they had a voice through their representatives in the
selection of officers. By contrast, the women of the Iroquois chose war
chiefs, "selected from the eligible sons of the female families holding
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the head Lordship titles." In the Albany Plan the Grand Council also
had the powers of raising soldiers, building forts, and equipping vessels
for defense purposes; none of these powers was given to the sachems in
the League Council.
In order for the Grand Council to function, the Albany Plan
^granted it the power to make laws, subject to the approval of Parliament
and the Crown. This Council could pass laws only in certain areas—  for
governing newly-formed settlements on the frontier, raising and
regulating soldiers, regulating the Indian trade, and laying duties on
178
member colonies. The Council could not interfere with the laws or
taxes of individual colonies, however. Therefore, most of the laws which 
the Council could pass dealt with external affairs. The League's "Great 
Peace" made no specific stipulations about law-making, except to describe
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the method for making decisions in the League's Council.
Similarities appeared in the conduct of external affairs. Both
plans stipulated how treaties with foreign nations were to be made.
Franklin realized that the "power of making peace or war with Indian
nations is at present supposed to be in every colony," but because "one
colony might make peace with a nation that another was justly engaged in
war with . it was thought better to have all treaties of a general
nature under a general direction . so the good of the whole may be
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consulted and provided for." The Iroquois, too, provided for
conferring with nations who wished to enter the "Great Peace." When the 
Iroquois encountered the Europeans, the Indians revised their forms of 
treaty-making because they could not bring the European nations into the 
"Great Peace." To function, they formed "covenant chains" with the Euro­
peans such as those formed at various conferences with the British.
Understandably Indian affairs would present the Grand Council 
with special situations addressed by the Albany Plan. It stipulated that 
the Council should handle Indian trade because "many quarrels and wars 
have arisen between the colonies and Indian nations, through the bad
conduct of traders; who cheat the Indians after making them drunk, &c. to
180the great expence of the colonies." Possibly Franklin wrote this sec­
tion of the Albany Plan, remembering a drunken scene at the Carlisle con­
ference of 1753. Franklin knew that particular colonies, whose interests
in the trade were more intense than others, would balk at being regu-
181lated, but again he felt it would "be best for the whole." The plan
allowed the Council to make all purchases of Indian lands which did not 
lie within colony boundaries. Apparently, one purchaser seemed better
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than many, and the best purchaser had to be the crown, or the union in
the name of the crown. On the surface this seemed more equitable to all
concerned than purchases by individuals. Unlike the plan, the League had
no special provisions for dealing with Europeans until the "covenant
chain" developed after contact with settlers.
A final external function of the Grand Council and President-
General was to form new settlements on the lands purchased from the
Indians. The Grand Council would grant the land to settlers in small
tracts and would charge a quit-rent which could be placed in a fund for 
the general treasury to use. Through the establishment of new settle­
ments, Franklin hoped that British colonies might be formed in the west,
for "the power of settling new colonies is . . . thought a valuable part
_ _ . ,,182 of the plan."
Ultimately the greatest difference between the plan and League
structures was created by Great Britain. The British colonies held very
little of the freedom that the Six Nations supposedly enjoyed in
decision-making. British authority overrode everything the Grand Council
did; laws passed had to be sent to England for the approval of the King,
sitting in the Privy Council, and were, "if not disapproved within Three
183years after Presentation to remain in Force." Franklin, in his
defense of the plan, thought British approval was necessary "to preserve
the connection of the parts of the British empire with the whole, of the
members with the head, and to induce greater care and circumspection in
making of the laws, that they be good in themselves and for the general 
184benefit." Twenty years later there would be a different tone in the
colonies, but in 1754 the colonists were British, and Franklin felt proud
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of the empire.
Finally, the social foundations of two distinct societies
contributed to differences in the plans. The Albany Plan made no mention
of religion or ceremony; political necessity formed its core. The "Great
Peace," however, depended on ceremony; even the song of war mentioned the
"Almighty Creator," and the Dekanawidah myth of creation noted the "Great
185Creator from whom we are all descended." The Iroquois constitution
protected religious rites and festivals; symbolism formed the basis for 
the League structure. The Iroquois could not separate politics from re­
ligious ceremony in their daily lives, whereas the English tradition 
eventually led to a separation of the two realms.
Unfortunately, truly comparing the League's "Great Peace" with 
the Albany Plan depends on understanding fully the League structure. Un­
derstanding fully the League structure depends on faithful documenta­
tion, particularly from the eighteenth century, the period when Benjamin 
Franklin knew of the League. However, since no documentation from that 
century exists, ethnographers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
wrote down the League's traditional myth as best as they could, based on 
what they learned from the oral tradition of their native informants.
Several differing versions exist of the Iroquois creation myth, 
each author feeling his to be the most accurate. Lewis Henry Morgan, one 
of the earliest ethnographers, wrote in 1845 of "the people whose sachems
had no cities— whose religion had no temple— whose government had no 
186
record." He believed that Iroquois tradition, "with its laws, rulers,
and mode of administration, [had] come down to them through many
187
generations with scarcely a change. In 1851, Morgan wrote his classic
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League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee, Iroquois, for which he has been called
188the founder of American anthropology. In this work, Morgan
acknowledged the assistance of Ely S. Parker, a Seneca engineer and later
a Union general, whose "intelligence and accurate knowledge of the
institutions of his forefathers, have made his friendly services a
189
peculiar privilege."
The next major work, Horatio Hale's Iroquois Book of Rites, ap­
peared in 1883. Hale received similar versions of the myth from two 
native informants, Chief John Johnson, a Canienga (or Mohawk) and John 
Buck, the Onondaga wampum keeper at the time. The author believed that 
the version supplied by Johnson was written down in 1757 by a Canienga 
chief named "David." Hale combined the two versions into what William
Fenton considered to be the first scholarly account of the League's 
190creation myth.
In 1892, J. N. B. Hewitt, a staff member of the Bureau of
American Ethnology at the Smithsonian Institution and of Tuscarora
descent, recorded the "Legend of the Founding of the Iroquois League"
from native informants, mainly John Buck, who had also assisted Hale.
According to Fenton, Hewitt's version "is richest in symbolism and
191
contains detail nowhere else available." Hewitt also used Seth
Newhouse and, later, Chief John A. Gibson as sources. Newhouse, an Onon­
daga, prepared an early version of the myth in 1885. Gibson, a Seneca 
who served as the ritual leader of the Onondaga longhouse, dictated the
myth in Onondaga to Hewitt in 1899. Gibson later would dictate a longer
192version to A. A. Goldenweiser in 1912, just before the chief's death. 
According to those who knew Hewitt, he strove to find the one true
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version of the League's creation myth, a desire that most likely served
as both a driving force and a stumbling block to the man.
Seemingly in dissatisfaction with Newhouse's semi-official 1885 
version of the myth, a committee of chiefs from the Six Nations reserve
on the Grand River in Canada compiled another version of the myth that
was published in 1912 by another student of the League, Duncan C. Scott, 
who for many years served as Secretary of the Department of Indian 
Affairs. According to Scott, the typewritten manuscript of the 
"Traditional History of the Confederacy of the Six Nations" was "prepared
by one of the Indians, and the whole work from its shadowy basis of
193legend to its mechanical execution is a native production." 
Apparently, the chiefs realized that many of the Iroquois' traditions 
"have been long relegated to oblivion" because they were not recorded in 
writing, and the committee decided to take action. However, the chiefs
did realize that the League "has been maintained in accordance with the
194rules of the Confederacy as laid down by the founder of the League," 
and hence, they had something positive to record.
Perhaps the best known version of the Iroquois Confederacy's 
creation myth came from the pen of Arthur Parker. Parker, State 
Archaeologist of New York in the early twentieth century and grand-nephew 
of Ely Parker, became an anthropologist and museum curator. Parker's
version has been accepted as an original manuscript for too long. As
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William Fenton wrote, Parker performed "two acts of literary piracy." 
Parker claimed to have "discovered" two manuscripts at the Six Nations 
reserve in 1910. In actuality, however, one of these manuscripts was 
that of Seth Newhouse, and Hewitt already knew of this version; it was
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not a revelation. Parker also "found" a second manuscript, the
version prepared in 1900 by the committee of chiefs and published in 1912 
by Duncan Scott. Although Parker's version is as accurate as any other, 
his apparent eagerness to publish caused him to sacrifice some of his 
integrity.
As a result, attacks came from two sources— A. A. Goldenweiser
and J. N. B. Hewitt. Goldenweiser criticized Parker for failing to
mention that the second manuscript, the chiefs', appeared earlier in
print by Scott. Goldenweiser claimed that the chiefs' account "gives the
197fullest version of the legend recorded to date." He, like several
other scholars, believed that the Newhouse version "reflects Iroquois
society at a much later stage in its development than is the case in M S .2
[the chiefs' version]," and that Newhouse attempted to make a political
198statement in order to resurrect Iroquois culture. Finally,
Goldenweiser concluded that "MS.1, as an integral code, cannot justly be
regarded as a genuine native product . , [and is] conspicuously un-
Indian in character. In a sense, then, 'The Constitution of the Five
Nations' is a figment. It does not exist. For, apart from the legend of
Deganawida, Indians of the Iroquois League had no consitution, either
199written or unwritten."
J. N. B. Hewitt, bitterly critical of all versions except his 
own, lambasted Parker for the latter's failures and mistakes. In 1892 
Hewitt wrote his version, the "Legend of the Founding of the Iroquois 
League," with information obtained primarily from John Buck in 1888. In 
1899, Hewitt worked with Chief John A. Gibson. Through his experiences, 
Hewitt learned of the work of Newhouse in 1897, of the chiefs' version,
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and ultimately, of Scott's publication. Hewitt criticized Parker for 1)
failing to point out conflicts between the two manuscripts used by
Parker, 2) failing to note that the chiefs' version was a substitute for
M S .1 which the chiefs rejected as erroneous in a number of ways, and 3)
stating that he "discovered" the two manuscripts in 1910, when, in fact,
both were known, one since the 1880s, and the other since 1900.^^
Although publications regarding the League's creation myth became
scarce in the second quarter of the twentieth century, Paul A. W. Wallace
related it again in 1946 in The White Roots of Peace. On the one hand,
Wallace chose to rely most heavily on the Gibson version of the myth, the
version most favored by Fenton. However, Wallace boldly stated that the
"United Nations of the Iroquois" was "the famous Indian confederacy that
provided a model for, and an incentive to, the transformation of the
201thirteen colonies into the United States of America." Wallace's ver­
sion, only a combination of all versions, with no documentation to
differentiate between them in the text, presented no new information and 
shed no new light on the Iroquois creation myth.
After reviewing all of the evidence given by informants and the 
statements recorded by ethnographers, William Fenton, the leading student 
of the Iroquois in the twentieth century, concluded that the "most
satisfactory single native account of the League" is a combination of the
two texts dictated by Chief Gibson— one in 1899 to Hewitt, and the other
202in 1912 to A. A. Goldenweiser. In 1975, Fenton set down his thoughts
regarding the Dekanawidah epic. He procured his information from the two
Gibson versions, translated by Gibson's descendants. In "The Lore of the 
Longhouse: Myth, Ritual and Red Power," Fenton noted that the myth
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changed every time it was retold, and that it was not necessary, "as
Hewitt vainly sought," to "pursue the search for the one true version."
Fenton continued, "We are rather grateful for what exists and we employ
203all of it, as the historian uses his sources critically." Fenton, not
overly critical of Parker in the final analysis, praised the former for
his success in collecting information from living sources, and "what he
salvaged in the mesh of undeveloped ethnological theory can fortunately
be reinterpreted and perhaps even reworked with living Iroquois 
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informants." However, Fenton decided that "none of the versions, nor
all of them together, approach the nature of a charter or constitution," 
as Parker and others stated.
Problems exist in trying to record an oral tradition such as the 
Dekanawidah epic. The discrepancies and disagreements between the ver­
sions hint at the danger in using such versions as documentary sources 
for the League's political structure. An accurate comparison with 
Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan cannot even be made, because the League 
probably was incomprehensible, even to Iroquois informants of the nine­
teenth and twentieth centuries. Parker's "Constitution," Fenton noted, 
"represents the effort of native scribes to codify custom law and usage
in the face of pressures from without and to answer criticism from within
206
a native society." in other words, any informant's view of the
political situation at his particular time colored his report of the 
myth.
So too in Franklin's time; his informants did not understand the 
League as they witnessed it, or colored their report to Franklin, based 
on their particular situation or relationship with the League's members.
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Again, if the descriptions of ethnographers and ethnohistorians differ
or are uncertain regarding the League's political nature, then Franklin
certainly could not grasp its depth or degree of organization, and no
comparison can be made between the two plans as they exist in the
twentieth century.
In speaking of the character of the two ethnic groups, Daniel K.
Richter of Dickinson College noted that "Europeans were dense, and
207
Iroquois were secretive." Richter concluded that the League sachems
wielded very little power in the colonial period, despite their
traditional titles and the intended powers of the League Council; he
maintained that others, sometimes Pine Tree chiefs and war chiefs,
"eclipsed the League Sachems in matters of politics and diplomacy."
Richter based his conclusions on the fact that the names of the fifty
208League sachems seldom appear in Euro-American records. More than
likely, Franklin had a glimpse of the reality of the Iroquois situation, 
and never came into contact with the traditional, idealistic image the 
Iroquois desired for themselves that came down to the twentieth century
as Dekanawidah's legend of the founding of the League. In other words,
the League the ethnographers studied was not the same League with which 
Franklin had contact.
Perhaps Franklin honestly intended to use the League, as he saw 
it, as his model. Again, however, a stumbling block appears. Historiog­
raphy shows that he was not the sole author of the Albany Plan; others, 
particularly Thomas Hutchinson, played a role. Franklin admitted that he
was "oblig'd to alter some Things" and that a "few Amendments" were added
209by the Committee at the Albany Congress. In "The Drafting of the
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Albany Plan of Union: A Problem in Semantics/" Lawrence Gipson concluded
that "each of the two men played leading parts in bringing the Albany
Plan of Union into existence. They may therefore be properly called the
210joint architects of it." Hence, despite Franklin's intentions, a
number of authors— namely, Franklin, Hutchinson, and the Committee
members— contributed to the resulting Albany Plan, which very vaguely
resembles the intended structure for the Iroquois League, as set down in
the traditional myth of creation.
Myths or stories "live because people want to believe them,"
211according to Francis Jennings. He believed that replacing myths with
history is painful but is a necessary weapon against cultural 
egocentrism.
Replacing myths with historical fact is not always easy, 
especially when the facts are lacking. In this case, no one will ever 
know just how much Franklin knew or understood about the Iroquois, or how 
sincere his intentions were to create a duplicate of the Iroquois League, 
however it appeared to him in his century. Although he called the 
Iroquois "Savages," he was sensitive to their strength and cohesiveness 
in their League.
Actually, the Iroquois probably influenced Franklin very little.
More likely he took his ideas from the writings of philosophers; a study
212of his philosophical leanings may reveal his sources.
Since historians are so uncertain about the basis for Franklin's 
ideas, the myth lingers; it is stubborn and difficult to debunk. In the 
last two centuries the myth concerning the Albany Plan and further, the 
United States Constitution, seems to have evolved easily. Like many
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American myths, this one presents a way for students of the past to
appreciate possible native American contributions to the developing
United States. But Thomas Bailey's warning to historians must still be
heeded: "New hypotheses should certainly be encouraged, but if the
evidence is lacking or scanty, they should be advanced with the utmost 
213tenderness."
APPENDIX I
ALBANY PLAN OF UNION
At a Meeting in the Court House at Albany on Wednesday the 10th July 
1754. A.M.
PRESENT--Joseph Murray and W™ Smith EsqrS of the Council of New 
York. All the Commiss except Henry Sherburn Esq one
of the Commiss for New Hampshire.
r
M Franklin reported the draught in a new form of a plan of a
Union, agreable to the determination of yesterday which was read
paragraph by paragraph, [and debated] and the further consideration of it 
deferred to the afternoon.
adjourned to 3 o'clock this afternoon.
At a Meeting &c. on Wednesday the 10th July 1754. P.M.
t r
PRESENT— His Honour the Lieut Gov and the four Gentlemen of the
ITSCouncil of New York and all the Commiss for the 
respective Governments.
The consideration of a plan of a Union was resumed which plan is as 
follows:
PLAN of a proposed UNION of the several Colonies of Massachusets 
Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, 
New Jerseys, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina, for their mutual defence 
and security, and for extending the British Settlements 
in North America.
That humble application be made for an Act of £he Parliament of 
Great Brittain, by virtue of which, one General Govern may be formed i^ 
America, including all the said Colonies, within, and under which Govern 
each Colony may retain each present constitution, except in the 
particulars wherein a charge may be directed by the said Act, as 
hereafter follows.
That the said General Govern s be administered by a president 
General, to be appointed & supported by the Crown, and a grand Council to 
be chosen by the representatives of the people of the several Colonies,
66
67
That within Months after the passing of such Act, The house
of representatives in the several Assemblies, that Happen to be sitting
within that time or that shall be specially for that purpose convened,
may and shall chose, Members for the Grand Council in the following
proportions, that is to say:
Massachusets Bay.......................7
New Hampshire......................... 2
Connecticut........................... 5
Rhode I s land........................... 2
New York................................4
New J e r s e y s ...............  3
Pennsylvania........................... 6
Maryland................................4
Virginia. . ........................... 7
North Carolina......................... 4
South Carolina......................... 4
48
Who shall meet for the present time at the City of Philadelphia 
in Pennsylvania, being called by the President General as soon as 
conveniently may be after his appointment.
That there shall be a New Election of Members for the Grand 
Council every three years, and on the death or resignation of any Member, 
his place shall be supplyed by a new choice at the next sitting of the 
Assembly of the Colony he represented.
That after the first three years, when the proportion of money 
arising out of each Colony to the General Treasury can be known, the 
number of Members to be chosen, for each Colony shall from time to time 
in all ensuing Elections be regulated by that proportion (yet so as that 
the Number to be chosen by any one province be not more than seven nor 
less than two).
That the Grand Council shall meet once in every year, and oftener 
if occasion require, at such time and place as they shall adjourn to at 
the last preceeding meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at by the 
President General, on any emergency, he having first obtained in writing 
the consent of seven of the Members to such call, and sent due and timely 
notice to the whole.
That the Grand Council have power to chuse their speaker, and 
shall neither be dissolved prorogued, nor continue sitting longer than 
six weeks at one time without their own consent, or the special command 
of the Crown.
That the Members of the Grand Council shall be allowed for their
services ten shillings sterling per diem, during their Sessions or
Journey to and from the place of Meeting; twenty miles to be reckoned a 
days Journey.
That the Assent of the President General be requisite to all Acts
of the Grand Council, and that it be his Office and duty to cause them to
be carried into execution.
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That the President General with the advice of the Grand Council, 
hold or direct all Indian Treaties in which the general interest or 
welfare of the Colonys may be concerned; and make peace or declare War 
with the Indian Nations. That they make such Laws as they judge 
necessary for the regulating all ^Indian Trade. That they make all 
purchases from Indians for the Crown, of lands [now] not within the 
bounds of particular Colonies, or that shall not be within their bounds 
when some of them are reduced to more convenient dimensions. That they 
make new settlements on such purchases by granting Lands, [in the King's 
name] reserving a Quit rent to the Crown, for the use of the General 
Treasury.
That they make Laws for regulating & governing such new
settlements, till the Crown shall think fit to form them into particular 
Govern
That they raise and pay Soldiers, and build Forts for the defence 
of any of the Colonies, and equip vessels of Force to guard the Coasts 
and protect the Trade on the Ocean, Lakes, or great Rivers; but they 
shall not impress men in any Colonies without the consent of its
Legislature. That for these purposes they have power to make Laws and
lay and Levy such general duties, imposts or taxes, as to them shall
appear most equal and just, considering the ability and other
circumstances of the Inhabitants in the several Colonies, and such as may 
be collected with the least inconvenience to the people, rather
discouraging luxury, than loading Industry with unnecessary burthens.—  
That they m^ght appoint a General Treasurer and a particular Treasurer in 
each Govern when necessary, ^nd from time to time may order the sums in 
the Treasuries of each Govern , into the General Treasury, or draw on 
them for special payments as they find most convenient; yet no money to 
issue but by joint orders of the President General and Grand Council, 
except where sums have been appropriated to particular purposes, and the 
President General is previously impowered by an Act to draw for such 
sums.
That the General accounts shall be yearly settled and reported to 
the several Assemblies.
That a Quorum of the Grand Council impowered to act with the
President General, do consists of twenty five Members, among whom there
shall be one or more from a majority of the Colonies. That the Laws made 
by them for the purposes aforesaid, shall not be repugnant, but as near 
as may be agreable to the Laws of England, and shall be transmitted to 
the King in Council for approbation, as soon as may be after their 
passing, and if not disapproved within three years after presentation to 
remain in Force.
That in case of the death of the President General, the Speaker 
of the Grand Council for the time being shall succeed, and be vested with 
the same powers and authority, to continue until the King's pleasure be 
known.
That all Military Commission Officers, whether for land or sea 
service, to act under this General constitution, shall be nominated by 
the President General, but the aprobation of the Grand Council is to be 
obtained before they receive their Commissions; and all Civil Officers 
are to be nominated by the grand Council, and to receive the President 
General's approbation before they officiate; but in case of vacancy by
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death or removal of any Officer Civil or Military under this 
constitution, The Gov of the Province in which such vacancy happens, may 
appoint till the pleasure of the President General and grand Council can 
be known.— That the particular Military as well as Civil establishments 
in each Colony remain in their present State this General constitution 
notwithstanding. And that on sudden emergencies any Colony may defend 
itself, and lay the accounts of expence thence arisen, before the 
President General and Grand Council, who may allow and order payment of 
the same as far as they judge such accounts just and reasonable.
After debate on the foregoing glan:
Resolved. That the Commiss from the several Govern be
desired to lay the same before their respective constituents for their
consideration, and that the Secretary to this Board transmit a copy
thereof with their vote thereon to the Governor of each of the Coloniesrs
which have not sent their Commiss to this Congress.
His Honour proposed to the Board that agreable to their
resolution of the 24. June, they would now consider the expediency of
building Forts in the Indian Country. It was determined, that
considering the present wavering disposition of the Senecas it was
expedient that a Fort should be built in their Country at a place called
Irondequat or Tierondequat.
Ordered. That a Committee be appointed to consider what further
Forts may be necessary in the Country of the Six Nations, and that each
Colony name a Member for this Committee.r r
Ordered. That M Chambers and M Peters be a Committee to revise
the Minutes settled and agreed to by this Board.
adjourned till tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock.
London Documents XXXI in E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to 
the Colonial History of the State of New York, 15 vols. (Albany: Weed,
Parsons and Co., 1855), 6:889-891.
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